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Today’s Points:

Celebrating Independence, of the Central Bank?

President Donald Trump wants us to know that his opinions on monetary policy differ from those currently in charge of the Federal Reserve. On Truth Social, he has posted this:

Jerome “Too Late” Powell, and his entire Board, should be ashamed of themselves for allowing this to happen to the United States. They have one of the easiest, yet most prestigious, jobs in America, and they have FAILED — And continue to do so. If they were doing their job properly, our Country would be saving Trillions of Dollars in Interest Cost. The Board just sits there and watches, so they are equally to blame. We should be paying 1% Interest, or better!

To make his point clearer, he added this illustration:

Bully-boy tactics from this White House are not new. And Trump has a point. Points of Return showed two weeks ago that the Fed was increasingly an outlier among developed world central banks. Here, without the presidential Sharpie, is our own chart of the phenomenon:

The post followed Sonali Basak’s interview with Scott Bessent for Bloomberg TV, in which he more diplomatically suggested that the Fed was burned by its terrible mistake in leaving rates low in 2021, igniting the worst round of inflation in two generations, and was “a little frozen at the wheel.” 

Politicians will always try to influence the Fed, but this administration’s tactics are growing subtler and cleverer. Firing Powell, who Trump appointed in his first term, would run into serious legal difficulty and fatally compromise any notion of the central bank’s independence. Trump threatened to do this two months ago (analyzed here) and swiftly backed down. But there are other ways to undermine Powell, and a number of plausible successors that Trump could nominate.

The new idea is to name the next Fed chair this summer, to be confirmed months before Powell’s term ends next May. Powell would be a lame duck, and it would be his successor who set longer-term expectations. Powell may or may not quit in those circumstances, but it wouldn’t matter much — the Fed would be run by someone whose chief virtue was a willingness to cut rates. Though maybe not all the way to 1%.

It’s clear that this has reduced the market’s estimate of where rates will go next year. A less independent Fed means less confidence in the dollar, which tanked on Liberation Day and is at a fresh three-year low:

Bloomberg’s World Interest Rate Probabilities function shows futures predicting fed funds of below 3% by the end of next year, its lowest forecast since last September’s “jumbo cut.” This is a big divergence from the “dot plot” published two weeks ago by the Fed, which had the median FOMC member expecting three cuts fewer:

The presidential assertion that a lenient Fed could bring government borrowing costs down to 1% doesn’t hold up to scrutiny. As has been clear for 20 years, central banks can control overnight rates but not 10-year bond yields. In the mid-2000s, Alan Greenspan moaned about the conundrum that the 10-year yield stayed stable as he hiked fed funds again and again — and last year, the 10-year greeted a one percentage point fall in fed funds with a one percentage point rise of its own: 

While 1% fed funds probably wouldn’t help the government finance its deficit, history suggests it would stoke inflation. Since 1990, there is only one instance of the rate dropping that low when core inflation is as high as it is now — in 2021, the year of the Powell Fed’s notorious “transitory” mistake. There are good arguments that the rate should be lower than it is now. There is no sensible case that it should be as low as 1%:

Are current rates damaging? There are various ways to measure this, but again it’s hard to justify the Trumpian ire. To determine how tight a rate is, compare it to inflation. That could be done using the latest actual inflation number, or the breakeven bond market prediction for the next year. Or you could look at the 10-year TIPS yield, reflecting the rate borrowers will get above inflation. 

Those measures are laid out here. They agree that policy was way too loose in 2021. They also concur that the current real rate is a bit below 2%, which is on the high side but lower than rates on the eve of the Global Financial Crisis — when hindsight suggests they were too low:

Is this hurting? Since Jimmy Carter, the “misery index” — the unemployment rate plus the inflation rate — has been a standard measure, which handily captures both sides of the Fed’s mandate. The US index is low, and below all major peers except Japan — and even there, the gap is closing. Rates aren’t hurting yet:

Viewing financial conditions more broadly, including credit spreads and equity valuations to capture how hard it is to raise finance, again suggests that the Fed isn’t tightening the screws. Conditions are slightly easier in the euro zone, which has a weaker economy. Any number above zero suggests conditions are loose:

And while rates seem high by recent experience, they are arguably only normalizing after years of artificial stimulus to tide the economy through after the GFC. That is true of mortgage rates, while the yields on junk bonds are unremarkably low even in absolute terms: 

Central bank independence is an eternally difficult subject. It’s hard to disagree that institutions so powerful should have some degree of democratic accountability. The administration’s attacks on Powell will age badly, and drastic cuts will only make sense if the economy lapses into recession. But in the short term, Trump 2.0 wants a weak dollar, and it’s achieving that beautifully. 

An Independent Bank Remains Dependent — on Data

Data dependency can be painful, particularly when the numbers still say nothing clear about the key issue of the day — whether tariffs have an impact on consumer prices. There’s a lot of US data to come in a foreshortened Independence Day week, including an early edition of non-farm payrolls on Thursday. They might just provide some clarity after the last figures for May muddied the picture yet further.

Personal consumption expenditures provided the first hint that uncertainty over Washington’s trade policy was creeping into hard inflation numbers. The re-acceleration of the PCE deflator, the Fed’s preferred inflation metric, coupled with a decline in consumer spending, at least partially vindicates the “wait-and-see” approach:

Sluggish household demand, especially for services, extended further following the weakest quarter for personal consumption since the onset of the pandemic. Whether this kickstarts a sustained surge in prices or proves transitory remains to be seen. For now, the consumer pullback in spending and decline in income could be attributed to the unwinding of several factors. 

The data may capture the end of front-loading spending ahead of tariffs, especially for cars. Oxford Economics’ Michael Pearce also notes a weakening in discretionary services spending, notably in travel and hospitality, which reflects fading consumer sentiment. He expects this to spread to other discretionary spending over the rest of the year:

While tariff front-running distortions should fade, Pearce expects trade levies to take a toll on real disposable incomes, worsening the slowdown in spending. Meanwhile, PCE inflation for May gives little cause for alarm. This chart shows the trimmed mean (excluding outliers) produced by the Dallas Fed, on an annual and monthly basis — regarded by statistical purists as a strong measure of underlying inflation. The decline is slow, but it’s not re-accelerating:

The core measure, excluding food and fuel, did step up from 2.5% to 2.7%, largely thanks to durable goods prices — probably due to tariffs. That might also justify the Fed’s wait-and-see policy. Janus Henderson’s Greg Wilensky argues that a cut could still come in September, but would require meaningful weakness in payrolls:

While the spending numbers fell slightly (-0.1%) and came in below expectations, we would not read too much into these numbers as this weakness is probably primarily just payback from the jump in spending earlier this year as consumers tried to buy goods ahead of the tariffs.

Trade policy uncertainty is easing, even as the July 9 tariff pause deadline approaches. Constant Trump brinkmanship does not help. Christophe Boucher of ABN AMRO Investment Solutions notes that rising tariff pressure, piling on weak consumer spending, increases the risk of stagflation:

Overall, both the inflation and consumption data point to the first tangible signs of tariffs impacting the real economy. We’re not there yet, but if tariffs continue to rise and consumer spending, which accounts for nearly 70% of GDP, weakens further, the US could be heading toward the stagflation scenario the Fed is eager to avoid.

Retail space for lease in San Francisco. Photographer: David Paul Morris/Bloomberg

This makes life hard for the central bank. Sam Tombs of Pantheon Macro notes that after the tariffs introduced in 2018 (which were easier to avoid because they didn’t cover all countries like the Trump 2.0 version), the pass-through to prices came three to six months after their implementation. In the last two years, price rises for services gathered momentum in June and July; that suggests there could be another seasonal uptrend this year. However:

We continue to expect the labor market to weaken decisively in Q3, troubling the committee far more than the near-term momentum in the inflation data and convincing it to start reducing rates from September. 

Whether the Fed prioritizes supporting demand over combating temporary tariff-driven inflation will in all probability hinge on the data of the next three days, starting with Tuesday’s supply manager surveys from around the world. They are about to get a lot of data to feed their dependency. 

Richard Abbey

Survival Tips

OK, some Bloomberg media options. On Tuesday, Bloomberg Opinion will be holding a live Q&A on the first six months of 2025 in markets. Click here:

For podcasts, try these episodes of Trumponomics, Merryn Talks Money and Everybody’s Business. As they all have me in them, you might also take refuge in a great series of podcasts with my old mentor Martin Wolf talking to Paul Krugman. Some (many) vehemently disagree with both of them. If that’s the case, listen to what they’re saying and work out your response. Arguments with Martin, I promise you, are difficult to win.

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