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U.S. DEPARTMENT of STATE
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Office of the Spokesperson Today, the Department of State is designating 17 entities, individuals, and vessels to stem the flow of revenue that the Iranian regime uses to advance its nuclear program, and to enable shipping facilitators in multiple jurisdictions who, through obfuscation and deception, load and transport Iranian oil for sale to buyers. The Iranian regime continues to fuel conflict in the Middle East to fund its destabilizing activities. This behavior enables Iran to fund its nuclear escalations, support terrorist groups, and disrupt the flow of trade and freedom of navigation in waterways that are crucial to global prosperity and economic growth. The United States will continue to act against the network of maritime service providers, dark fleet operators, and petroleum products traders involved in the transport of Iranian crude oil and petroleum products. Concurrently, the Department of the Treasury is designating additional shipping networks involved in illicit oil schemes to help fund the Iranian regime, as well as an airline and its affiliates that supply arms to Iran-backed terrorist groups. For more information about Treasury’s action, please see Treasury’s Press Release. All Department of State targets are being designated pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13846, which authorizes and reimposes certain sanctions with respect to Iran. Continued Targeting of Maritime Services Providers Enabling Iran’s Petroleum Exports Iran’s MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM, NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY, and NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY (NITC), U.S.-designated entities, continue to rely on critical third-country service providers to enable the sale of Iranian petroleum and petroleum products. Maritime service providers, including pilotage firms and ship-to-ship (STS) transfer service providers, are crucial to Iran’s ability to transport crude oil and petroleum products to end users. STRASSELINK PTE. LTD. (STRASSELINK) is a Singapore-based maritime service provider that has provided pilotage services to NITC tankers on 13 occasions while they were carrying Iranian crude oil from January 1, 2025, to August 1, 2025, as they transited the Straits of Malacca. For all of these occasions, the tankers then discharged their cargo in STS transfers in Singapore’s Eastern Outer Port Limits (EOPL). On one such occasion, STRASSELINK knowingly engaged in a significant transaction for the transportation of Iranian petroleum when it provided pilotage services to the U.S.-designated NITC tanker DINO I (IMO 9569671) for its passage through the Straits of Malacca in June 2025, while it was carrying Iranian crude oil. FADZLON BIN AHMAD (FADZLON) is a Singaporean national and the managing director of STRASSELINK. FADZLON knowingly engaged in a significant transaction for the transportation of Iranian petroleum in his role as the managing director of STRASSELINK when he and the company provided pilotage services to the U.S.-designated NITC in 2025. MUHAMMAD DANIAL BIN FADZLON (DANIAL) is a Singaporean national and the senior operations manager of STRASSELINK. DANIAL knowingly engaged in a significant transaction for the transportation of Iranian petroleum in his role as the senior operations manager of STRASSELINK when he and the company provided pilotage services to the U.S.-designated NITC in 2025. By providing these services, STRASSELINK, FADZLON and DANIAL enabled the transfer of over 20 million barrels of Iranian crude oil. STRASSELINK, FADZLON and DANIAL are being designated pursuant to Section 3(a)(ii) of E.O. 13846 for knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran. The Department will continue to target entities and individuals that facilitate any element of Iran’s illicit petroleum supply chain. Continued Targeting of Iran’s Shadow Fleet The Department of State is designating five vessel management companies for their involvement in the transport of Iranian petroleum. Iran’s oil exports are enabled by a network of illicit shipping facilitators in multiple jurisdictions who, through obfuscation and deception, load and transport Iranian oil to buyers in third countries. The vessels managed by these companies have moved millions of barrels of Iranian crude oil and play a key role in the Iranian export supply chain and have also regularly engaged in dark activity and other deceptive shipping practices, endangering other vessels and trade flows. ANBO SHIPPING PTE. LTD. (ANBO SHIPPING) is a Singapore-based shipping company and the commercial manager of AL SIDDEEQ (IMO: 9312509), a Panama-flagged crude oil tanker, which loaded Iranian-origin crude oil in STS transfers with the U.S.-designated tankers EGRET (IMO: 9283801) and JANET (IMO: 9220952) in July and September 2025, respectively. ANBO SHIPPING is being designated pursuant to Section 3(a)(ii) of E.O. 13846 for knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran. AL SIDDEEQ is being identified as property in which ANBO SHIPPING has an interest. ARKADIA MARITIME INCORPORATED (ARKADIA) is a Marshall Islands-based shipping company and commercial manager of AQUARIS (IMO 9251822), a Panama-flagged crude oil tanker that loaded Iranian crude oil from the U.S.-designated BLUE GULF (IMO 9328716) in Singapore’s Eastern Outer Port Limits (EOPL) in August 2025. ARKADIA is being designated pursuant to section 3(a)(ii) of E.O. 13846 for knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran. AQUARIS is being identified as property in which ARKADIA has an interest. ERST GROUP LTD (ERST) is the Seychelles-based registered owner and commercial manager of BODHI (IMO: 9144782), a Cameroon-flagged crude oil tanker. BODHI has conducted multiple STS transfers of Iranian crude oil with U.S.-designated vessels in Singapore’s EOPL, most recently with the U.S.-designated vessel BERG 1 (IMO 9262168) on September 10, 2025. ERST is being designated pursuant to Section 3(a)(ii) of E.O. 13846 for knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran. BODHI is being identified as property in which ERST has an interest. SAO VIET PETROL TRANSPORTATION COMPANY LIMITED (SAO VIET) is a Vietnam-based commercial manager of two vessels, with which it has transported multiple shipments of Iranian crude oil worth hundreds of millions of dollars. SAO VIET was also designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 on January 10, 2025. SAO VIET is being designated pursuant to Section 3(a)(ii) of E.O. 13846 for knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran. The following vessels are being identified as property in which SAO VIET has an interest: DEEP CURRENT SHIPPING L.L.C (DEEP CURRENT) is a United Arab Emirates -based commercial manager of the Comoros-flagged vessel AVA 10 (IMO 9247986), which loaded over 700,000 barrels of Iranian crude oil during a STS transfer in Singapore’s EOPL with the PANDA, which loaded that cargo at Kharg Island, Iran. DEEP CURRENT is being designated pursuant to Section 3(a)(ii) of E.O. 13846 for knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran. AVA 10 is being identified as property in which DEEP CURRENT has an interest. Continued Targeting of Iranian Petroleum Products Traders This action also includes the designation of three entities across multiple jurisdictions, which have engaged in the transshipment, sale, and purchase of Iranian-origin petroleum products. Similar to Iran’s crude oil trade, petroleum products sales provide crucial revenue to the Iranian regime, which has continued to prioritize funding terror organization over its own people. Today’s action targets those intermediaries, the buyers and exporters of Iranian petroleum products. TR6 PETRO INDIA LLP (TR6 PETRO) is an India-based petroleum products trader, which between October 2024 and June 2025, imported over $8 million worth of Iranian-origin bitumen from multiple companies including BONJOURE COMMODITY F.Z.E. TR6 PETRO is being designated pursuant to Section 3(a)(ii) of E.O. 13846 for knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran. BONJOURE INTERNATIONAL FZCO (BONJOURE INTERNATIONAL) is a United Arab Emirates-based company that exported over $17 million worth of Iranian-origin petroleum products between April and June 2025. BONJOURE INTERNATIONAL is being designated pursuant to Section 3(a)(ii) of E.O. 13846 for knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran. BONJOURE COMMODITY F.Z.E. is a United Arab Emirates-based company that exported over $66 million worth of Iranian-origin petroleum products between January 2024 and June 2025 to numerous companies including TR6 PETRO. BONJOURE COMMODITY F.Z.E. is being designated pursuant to Section 3(a)(ii) of E.O. 13846 for knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran. SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS As a result of today’s sanctions-related actions, and in accordance with E.O. 13846, all property and interests in property of the designated persons described above that are in the United States or in possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). Additionally, all entities and individuals that have ownership, either directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. All transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons are prohibited unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC or exempt. These prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any blocked person and the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. The power and integrity of U.S. government sanctions derive not only from the U.S. government’s ability to designate and add persons to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. Petitions for removal from the SDN List may be sent to OFAC Reconsideration. Petitioners may also refer to the Department of State’s Delisting Guidance page.
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