Greetings from Nuuk, where a group of twenty CFR members are just wrapping up a week’s worth of meetings with political leaders, military officers, businesspeople, civil society representatives, and a wide range of local citizens. We traveled from the Inuit settlement of Saqqaq with 150 inhabitants to Nuuk, Greenland’s capital, with 20,000 residents. Why Greenland, you might ask? This trip was well in the works ahead of the recent surge of interest generated by President Trump’s determination to acquire it. If you look at some of the major issues facing the world today—the reemergence of great power rivalry, competition for critical minerals, protection of major sea lines of communication and trade, and the impact of climate change, they all come together in Greenland.
Yes, President Trump was on to something when he drew the world’s attention to the largest island on earth, even if his approach has been, let’s say, unconventional. But while his instincts might have been directionally correct, he came to the wrong conclusion: We don’t want or need to take over Greenland, by force or through purchase. We can get what the United States wants and needs without firing a shot or writing a big check.
First of all, it’s hard to imagine Trump wants to take over Denmark’s responsibility for subsidizing Greenland to the tune of $600 million per annum and rising each year. Second, a lot of the focus on critical mineral potential of Greenland might be just that: potential. In reality, there are huge challenges to Greenland developing a commercially viable critical minerals sector. That said, Greenland’s excess hydropower capacity could be economically attractive, particularly for energy intensive industries. Third, Greenland has strategic value for the United States, particularly with the melting of the polar ice caps which could create important new trade routes. Fourth, much of what the United States wants from Greenland, including access to more bases to address increased Arctic security needs, the Greenlanders are more than willing, indeed enthusiastic, to provide.
Ironically, Trump’s insistence that “we will have it” has driven the Greenlanders to appreciate their relationship with Denmark more than ever, despite a messy colonial past. Still, recent polls suggest that while about 80 percent of Greenlanders oppose joining the United States, about 80 percent also support independence from Denmark, provided it doesn’t worsen their standard of living. Greenland has 57,000 residents, a parliament with 31 representatives from 6 political parties — all but one of which are pro-independence. Their only difference on independence is timeline: now or in due time. But with an annual subsidy from Denmark of more than $10,000 per Greenlander, it’s hard to imagine when that time would come.
Much is made of Greenland’s mineral endowments, including more than thirty of the fifty critical minerals often cited as key to emerging technologies. But, even if Greenland goes all-in on commercializing its mineral resources, it is likely to take years, even decades, if ever, for it to materialize. There is a reason Greenland only has two active mines (for gold and anorthosite), notwithstanding that the government has issued more than seventy licenses for exploration and exploitation. Greenland is a tough place, period—thanks in large part to its frigid weather (where mines could only operate for roughly half the year), limited infrastructure (few ports and even fewer roads capable of handling mining trucks), and high costs to operate (which make it less commercially viable). Indeed, there are no profitable operations in Greenland today. Greenland’s sole gold mine has opened, closed, and is trying to open again.
At the same time, Greenland has a surplus of clean hydroelectric power, driven by the melting ice sheet, which is only likely to increase. By some measures, they could potentially heat 1 million homes but only have 20,000 households. This is potentially a near-term opportunity to explore the development of energy intensive industries that could tolerate Greenland’s harsh conditions. Is this a place to build new data centers, which are well-suited to cold climates? (Greenland would need more undersea fiber optic cables to make this work, but that is doable.) A smelter for aluminum? A producer of ammonia fertilizer?
As climate change continues to melt the polar ice caps, new trade routes running “over the top” of the world could open up, at least for part of the year. Hence the growing interest of China and Russia in expanding their Arctic footprint—by way of new heavy ice breakers and, in the case of Russia, new and expanded bases in the Arctic. Looking at a map of the polar region, one can’t help but be struck by the fact that Russia’s coast straddles nearly half the Arctic circle. If the polar route became a viable alternative to the Red Sea or the Panama Canal, Russia would be well positioned to impose a “tax,” if not its will, on global trade. China is, in fact, not very active in the Arctic but has recently participated in joint exercises with the Russians in the Bering Strait and along Russia’s Arctic territories.
If there was ever a time to look critically at the polar mission and what role the U.S. military might play in tandem with its allies, it’s now. And there’s a demonstrated appetite for it: earlier this year, the Pentagon shifted Greenland from the European Command’s area of responsibility to that of Northern Command (the unified combatant command responsible for protecting the homeland and territories closest to it); Denmark and the United States finalized a defense cooperation agreement; and the United States launched a renewed effort to add more icebreakers to its meager three-ship fleet.
The United States should evaluate its Arctic presence, including any necessary shifts to its force posture. Expanded cooperation between the United States and Greenland might mean more U.S. military bases and activity. For more than seventy years, the United States has operated bases in Greenland through a 1951 treaty that allows Washington to retain bases and establish new ones. At the height of the Cold War, the United States operated seventeen military facilities on Greenland, but today, there is just one Space Force base in the north of Greenland, Pituffik Space Base, which operates ballistic missile early warning systems that track threats to the U.S. homeland. In addition, every summer, the New York Air National Guard’s 109th Air Wing performs annual support missions delivering supplies to the National Science Foundation’s remote research sites, flying LC-130 “Skibirds” that are capable of landing on snow and ice.
Notwithstanding Greenlanders’ bristling at Trump’s aggressive stance, including his refusal to take the use of force off the table, they remain remarkably open to partnership with the United States. The Greenlanders I spoke with view their security interests as entirely aligned with those of the United States. Of course, as an autonomous territory within the Kingdom of Denmark, Greenland also falls under NATO’s security umbrella. The 1951 Treaty provides a roadmap for the United States to expand its presence. The Greenlanders would welcome that. There is no need to buy or take over Greenland to achieve our security objectives in the Arctic. All we need to do is ask.
Greenland’s economy is largely dependent on the export of fish, but recently there has been a surge in tourism. United Airlines has started twice weekly flights between Newark and Nuuk, and cruise ships have added stops in Greenland — somewhat to the dismay of the locals. There is a great need for more hotels, and we saw an abandoned golf course in Kangerlussuaq near what used to be a major U.S. airbase. If only we knew someone with expertise in hotels and golf courses.
We welcome your feedback on this column. Let me know what foreign policy issues you’d like me to address next by replying to president@cfr.org.
